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Stereotyping as Discrimination: 




Can we treat people in a discriminatory way in virtue of how we think about them? In this essay, 
I argue that the answer is yes. According to the constitutive claim, stereotyping constitutes 
discrimination, either sometimes or always. This essay defends the constitutive claim and 
explores the deeper justifications for it. I also sketch the constitutive claim’s larger ethical 
significance. One upshot is that we can wrongfully discriminate against (or in favor of) others in 
thought, even if we keep our views of others to ourselves. Second, if stereotyping is a form of 
discrimination, theories of wrongful discrimination bear on the ethical questions associated with 
stereotyping, including this one: under what conditions is it wrong to stereotype? In closing, I 
introduce an intriguing possibility, namely, that stereotyping is wrong if and when it constitutes 
wrongful discrimination.  
 
People often reveal that they have stereotyped others by what they say and do. When I drop off 
my six-year-old at a new summer camp, a counselor repeatedly refers to them as “he” because 
they are wearing athletic shorts and a cap. In Ralph Ellison’s novel Invisible Man, a white 
partygoer demands that a Black stranger sing a spiritual.1 Not all acts of stereotyping are like 
this. During a job interview, an employer may expect that a young female job candidate will 
have a baby in the next ten years but say nothing and hire the person anyway. An Apple 
employee may see an elderly customer walk up to the Genius Bar and think, “I bet they’ve 
scheduled an appointment because they don’t know how to use their new phone.” On the bus, I 
make silent assumptions about the gender, race, and professional status of my fellow riders. The 
person sitting in the back, I presume, is a white woman on the way to work at our local hospital. 
She’ll probably get off one stop after me. No one could know what I am thinking—and that I 
have been stereotyping my fellow passengers—when I say nothing and appear to be staring out a 
window. 
 Are we treating people in a discriminatory way by stereotyping them, even if we refrain 
from articulating our thoughts out loud? Feminist philosophers and theorists of race have long 
supposed that the answer is yes.2 In recent years, the view has been gaining ground with terms 
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like “epistemic discrimination” and “cognitive discrimination” becoming more common.3 
Injustices associated with stereotyping—including testimonial injustice—have also been 
described as “discriminatory injustice.”4 Behind this terminology, one finds what I call the 
constitutive claim. According to the constitutive claim, stereotyping constitutes discrimination, 
either sometimes or always.5 For some readers, this may sound like a truism. Others may be 
skeptical. How could it possibly be discrimination to stereotype someone “in your head,” if you 
keep your thoughts to yourself and don’t act on them? Against this skepticism, I will defend the 
constitutive claim and explore the deeper justifications for it.  
 The argument will proceed as follows. In Section 1, I define stereotyping and distinguish 
several ways to stereotype individuals. In Section 2, I argue that stereotyping can and often will 
constitute discrimination, understood in a non-moralized way. In Section 3, I argue that 
stereotyping can also constitute wrongful or unjust discriminatory treatment in some cases. In 
Section 4, I sketch the constitutive claim’s larger ethical significance. One upshot is that we can 
wrongfully discriminate against (or in favor of) others, even if we keep our thoughts to 
ourselves. Second, if stereotyping is a form of discrimination, theories of wrongful 
discrimination bear on the ethical questions associated with stereotyping, including this one: 
under what conditions is it wrong to stereotype? In closing, I introduce an intriguing possibility, 
namely, that stereotyping is wrong if and when it constitutes wrongful discrimination.  
 
1. WHAT IT MEANS TO STEREOTYPE  
In this section, I delve deeper into what it means to stereotype, focusing in particular on 
stereotyping individuals.   
 In psychological terms, “stereotyping” refers to a range of cognitive acts and processes 
that bear a family resemblance to one another.6 Groups as a whole can be stereotyped. To 
stereotype a group is to characterize that group as a collective entity. Characterizations might 
take the form of beliefs about typical group traits, mental imagery, or webs of associations with 
informational significance.7 Individuals can also be stereotyped. To stereotype an individual is to 
judge that person by real or apparent group membership.  
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 This last definition—simple as it may sound—hides a great deal of complexity. Consider 
the camp counselor who presumed that my six-year-old was a boy. This person stereotyped my 
child, according to the above definition. Here is what that means in the context: they categorized 
my child as a social type based on mere appearances. In the U.S., boys often wear baseball caps 
and athletic shorts. Girls tend to wear dresses and skirts; in general, their clothes are cut and 
styled differently than ones marketed to boys. As a six-year-old, my child wore a lot of sporty 
“boys” clothes, so they were often classified as a boy. When you categorize someone as a social 
type—for example, as a certain gender—based on how they look, you’re stereotyping someone. 
Stereotyping in this sense involves presumptive classification.  
 Often individuals are stereotyped in ways that go beyond presumptive classification. In 
Ellison’s Invisible Man, the white partygoer does not just categorize someone as Black; he also 
believes that this person sings spirituals because he is Black. In the tech support case, an 
employee not only classifies a customer as elderly but also suspects that they are technologically 
inept because of their age. Running into an emergency room, a panicked parent might presume 
that a person in a white coat is a doctor and can save his child’s life. Knowing that a colleague 
identifies as genderqueer, one might expect that their pronouns are likely “they/them.”8 What 
unifies these diverse instances of stereotyping—which involve a range of cognitive states such as 
beliefs, expectations, hunches, and suspicions—is that they involve “judging” persons by group 
membership in a broad sense.  
 Some theorists contend that stereotyping occurs in perception as well.9  Here is an 
example. A fellow philosopher once told me that she grew up believing that she was a loud 
person. Often people would comment on the loudness of her voice. Sometimes they suggested 
that she try to quiet down. As woman of Asian descent, she was expected to be soft-spoken and 
deferential. There are at least two ways to analyze what she experienced. One possibility is that 
people around her registered the decibel-level of her voice and then judged it to be too loud for 
an Asian woman. A second possibility is that people literally heard her voice as louder than they 
would have because of her social identity. If so, their aural experiences were warped by 
stereotyping. Though it is unclear how best to analyze the case, we have an intriguing possibility 
on our hands. Stereotyping someone might consist in hearing or seeing that person in ways that 
are driven by their real or perceived group membership. If so, stereotyping may manifest as 
distinctive sensory experience. 
 So far, I’ve documented the “thin” epistemic dimension of stereotyping. To judge an 
individual by group membership in a thin sense is to classify them as a social type and, typically, 
to form further cognitions or perceptions related to them as a result. However, stereotyping also 
has a second, “thicker” dimension. “To judge” also means to “make an assessment, evaluation, 
or appraisal.”10 When we stereotype people, we judge them in this more loaded evaluative sense 
as well.  
 The evaluative dimensions of stereotyping derive from two sources. In How the Body 
Shapes The Mind, Shaun Gallagher observes: humans have “a pragmatic way of being in the 
world.”11 For this reason, we invariably take up “an evaluative understanding” of others, the 
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world, and ourselves.12 The white partygoer in Ellison’s novel is a perfect example. His goals 
impact the stereotypical property he attributes to the narrator, i.e., an aptitude for singing. He is 
at the party to have a good time. As a result, he notices the narrator and invests his presumed 
ability to sing with positive significance. For agents with different goals, the narrator’s alleged 
ability to sing might have been perceived in a neutral or even negative light. So it goes for all 
acts of cognition, if Gallagher and others are right.13 Goals and interests shape what we think, 
pulling our thoughts in certain directions and giving them valence. The social world writ large 
also infuses our cognition with meaning. When we judge others by group membership, we 
situate them in particular “places” within the social world. Group hierarchies and power relations 
often—if not always—structure the normative expectations associated with these places. The 
white partygoer in Invisible Man presumes that the narrator will—and perhaps even should—
embrace a stereotypical role: the role of a happy-go-lucky Black entertainer, eager to cater to the 
whims of a white audience. Though acts of stereotyping differ in their evaluative and 
prescriptive implications, all acts of stereotyping involve placing people in norm-laden and 
prescriptively-charged social locations. 
 Let me now circle back to my original definitions. To stereotype a group, according to 
my proposed definition, is to characterize that group as a collective entity. To stereotype an 
individual is to judge that person by real or apparent group membership. One might object that 
these definitions are overbroad. Yet broadness is a virtue, in my view. These definitions are 
pitched at a high level of generality because there is no other way to identify the common thread 
in an otherwise diverse set of cases. Acts of stereotyping may be spontaneous or calculated. They 
may be epistemically defective or promote knowledge.14 In terms of who can be stereotyped, the 
same complexity holds. People can be targeted for stereotyping on the basis of membership in 
socially salient groups such as race or gender, or on the basis of membership in groups that are 
not socially salient, such as professional affiliation.15 It is even possible that people can be 
stereotyped on the basis of novel, gerrymandered social groups created in experimental 
conditions.16  
 Only expansive definitions like the ones that I am proposing are able to capture the full 
range of phenomena that fall under the label “stereotyping” and which ought to be considered in 
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an ethical investigation of stereotyping. These definitions have other benefits too. Despite their 
generality, they convey crucial and even surprising information. They announce that stereotyping 
is a cognitive phenomenon involving “judgment,” which is connected to core features of human 
rationality, including categorization, generalization, and induction.17 Moreover, the locution of 
“judging” people by group membership also flags the evaluative nature of stereotyping, thereby 
calling attention to the fact that stereotyping has two intertwined dimensions: a thin, epistemic 
aspect and a thicker evaluative aspect. Both of these dimensions will be important as I scrutinize 
the constitutive claim. 
2. STEREOTYPING AS DISCRIMINATION  
In this section, I discuss two ways to define discrimination. Each definition is non-moralized. 
Neither builds ethical wrongness into the very idea of what it means to discriminate. Both 
definitions entail that acts of stereotyping—even in thought—can constitute a form of 
discrimination. 
2.1 Discrimination as perceiving, noting, or making distinctions. The first definition of 
discrimination in the Oxford English Dictionary reads as follows: “the action of perceiving, 
noting, or making a distinction between things.”18 Definitions in this vein stretch back to at least 
the seventeenth century. In 1678, E. Phillips offers the following characterization: 
“Discrimination, putting a difference between one thing and another.”19 In 1864, F.C. Bowen 
talks of “a conscious discrimination of those respects in which it [a thing] is similar to others 
from those in which it is unlike them.”20 When contemporary theorists investigate the ethics of 
discrimination, they sometimes adopt definitions in this family. Deborah Hellman provides one 
example. In When is Discrimination Wrong?, she argues that to discriminate is “to draw a 
distinction between people on the basis of a certain trait: race, the letter of a person’s last name, 
sex, appearance, ability, age, or another attribute.”21  
 If drawing distinctions entails discriminating, stereotyping is always a form of 
discrimination. That’s because acts of stereotyping necessarily require “perceiving or noting or 
making a distinction” between allegedly different social kinds. The camp counselor who 
stereotyped my child as a boy, for example, noted gendered patterns of dress among kids. But 
they did something else as well. They carved up the social world in a particular way and assigned 
my child a specific, evaluatively-charged place within it.22 The same goes for stereotyping when 
it takes other forms. The white partygoer in Ellison’s novel believes that “all” Black people sing 
spirituals. He does not have this belief about white people. Group-specific distinctions such as 
this are always in the background when people stereotype. One might therefore characterize 
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stereotyping as a kind of cognitive discrimination, or classify it as a variety of epistemic 
discrimination, as writers increasingly have done.23  
2.2 Discrimination as differential, unequal, or disadvantageous treatment. A second family of 
views defines discrimination in terms of treatment. One popular view is that to discriminate is to 
treat people in a disadvantageous way because of their presumed group membership.24  This view 
blossoms into a range of competing views when theorists either (a) make it more specific or (b) 
challenge its adequacy and advance alternatives to it. A more expansive view, for example, is 
that discrimination consists in differential treatment based on group membership. Such treatment 
may be disadvantageous, advantageous, or neither. For theorists who adopt treatment-focused 
definitions, it is not obvious that stereotyping qualifies as discriminatory treatment. The key 
issue is this: what counts as treatment?  
 Start with this observation. It’s commonly said that laws and policies “treat” different 
groups differently. When a claim like this is advanced, the suggestion is not that these entities—
for example, the laws themselves—are literally behaving in a particular ways. Treatment here 
consists in the articulation or imposition of group-specific norms, permissions, obligations, or 
regulations. For instance, Executive Order 9066—signed by U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt 
in 1942—treated Japanese Americans in a distinctive way by mandating that they relocate to 
internment camps. Voting laws in the U.S. South treated Black citizens in a distinctive way by 
requiring them to pass polls tests before voting. Corporate policy at 1950s law firms treated 
women in a particular way by prohibiting their hire. Call this the regulative view of 
discriminatory treatment. In each of the above cases, the treatment in question was not just 
differential. It was profoundly unequal. 
 A second paradigmatic kind of “treatment” occurs in behavior. Call this the behavioral 
view of discriminatory treatment. In an interview, Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
once offered the following example.25 When she graduated from Stanford Law School in 1952, 
she could not find a job. Every firm that she called told her the same thing: “We don’t hire 
women.” It made no difference that she had graduated at the top of her class. This is a 
paradigmatic example of discriminatory treatment in the behavioral sense. If you were a white 
man who graduated at the top of your class at Stanford in the 1950s, you weren’t turned away 
with a few words when you inquired about a job. You were spoken to politely, sought after, 
courted. If you appeared to be an American of Japanese heritage in 1942, police would ask you 
for your papers. If you were a Black person trying to vote in 1950, you may have a poll test 
pushed on you. In such cases, people are being treated in discriminatory ways in a literal 
behavioral sense due to their group membership.  
 Given these two paradigmatic senses of discriminatory treatment, the constitutive claim 
may seem dubious. But further investigation dispels the impression. Below I present three 
arguments in its favor. Together these arguments reveal a rich, multi-faceted basis for the 
constitutive claim.  
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The epistemic shortcut argument. The first argument notes that stereotyping is often a shortcut, 
and it goes as follows: 
 
1. To stereotype is—often if not always—to take a shortcut. 
 
2. Taking a shortcut with respect to someone can be discriminatory. 
__________________ 
 
3. Stereotyping—qua shortcut—can constitute discriminatory treatment. 
 
 Start with premise 1: to stereotype someone is—often if not always—to take a shortcut.26 
The claim here is plausible. Stereotyping is a comparatively fast way of judging individuals. 
Instead of having to seek out personalized information about individuals, stereotyping allows us 
to judge persons—e.g., form beliefs, expectations, and predictions about them—based on their 
presumed group membership. The method is efficient, and it obviates the need to pursue person-
specific information.  
 Premise 2 is also intuitive: taking a shortcut with respect to someone can be 
discriminatory. To illustrate the premise, consider a case described by Frantz Fanon.27 On a train, 
a Black man is looking for the dining car. He asks another passenger for directions: “Excuse me, 
could you please tell me where the restaurant car is?” The man—who is white— responds in 
pidgin: “Sure sonny, you go corridor, you go straight, go one car, go two car, go three car, you 
there.”28 What has just happened? One possibility is that the white passenger has been 
intentionally rude. He knows that he is interacting with a fluent French speaker, but responds in 
pidgin in order to express racial contempt. A second possibility—and the one on which I will 
focus here—is that white passenger mistakenly presumes that the Black man lacks fluency in 
French because he has not been paying sufficient attention. Instead of stopping for a minute and 
carefully listening, he stereotypes. Was taking this shortcut discriminatory? If it were, a 
hypothetical would be true. Had a fellow white man approached him, the white train passenger 
would have listened more carefully, perhaps put down his newspaper. When racially motivated, 
taking epistemic shortcuts constitutes discriminatory treatment.  
 One might wonder what notion of “discriminatory treatment” underlies premise 2. 
According to one line of thought, it is the behavioral notion. The idea here is not that stereotypic 
snap judgments constitute behavior per se. Rather, the view is that shortcuts must be contrasted 
with the relevant alternative, i.e., more laborious and careful ways of judging individuals. More 
laborious methods of judgment involve doing things in a literal behavioral sense: asking 
questions, listening carefully, looking up information online, and so forth. Keeping this contrast 
in mind, here is the proposal. The white train passenger would have taken a longer epistemic 
route, hence would have behaved differently, if a visibly white stranger had approached him. The 
counterfactual behavior is what grounds the claim that stereotyping constitutes discriminatory 
treatment. According to a second line of thought, shortcuts are best understood as failures of 
action. Instead of gathering more information, the white passenger “stays in his head” and 
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stereotypes. This failure to act and pursue better information is discriminatory because it is 
racially motivated.29 
 Together these two premises provide an elegant, relatively uncontroversial argument for 
the constitutive claim. If acts of stereotyping involve taking shortcuts and taking shortcuts can 
constitute discriminatory treatment, then stereotyping can sometimes constitute discriminatory 
treatment. The “sometimes” here is a result of two scenarios. In some cases, people stereotype 
because they are pressed for time and would have used an epistemic shortcut no matter what the 
presumed social identity of the stereotyped person. In other cases, people stereotype because 
they are making judgments in conditions of extremely limited information and would be forced 
to stereotype anyone. Even so, Fanon’s example gives us reason to believe that stereotyping will 
frequently constitute discriminatory treatment. In particular, individuals from privileged groups 
may often judge people from socially marginalized groups in fast ways, rather than using more 
attentive, careful epistemic methods that would require more effort. In other situations, the 
opposite pattern of treatment takes hold: privileged individuals judge other privileged individuals 
quickly using stereotypic shortcuts, while deploying more laborious methods when judging 
individuals from marginalized groups.30 In both cases, stereotyping—qua epistemic shortcut—
constitutes a form of unequal, discriminatory treatment.  
 
The embodied mind argument. A second argument rests on the claim that stereotyping is a form 
of embodied cognition. It goes as follows:  
 
1. Cognition is embodied. 
 
2. The embodiment thesis: “the agent's beyond-the-brain body plays a significant causal 
role, or a physically constitutive role, in that agent's cognitive processing.”31 
 
3. Acts of stereotyping—qua cognitive activity—may be partially constituted by a 
person’s body and their behavior, including discriminatory behavior. 
 ______________ 
 
4. Stereotyping can constitute discriminatory treatment. 
 
 To motivate premise 1—i.e., the claim that cognition is embodied, start with this 
observation. When humans perceive the world via sense modalities, we necessarily use our 
bodies. Seeing requires eyes, for example. We cannot see without numerous bodily movements, 
voluntary and involuntary. When a stranger perceives my child to be a boy, or the white person 
on the train classifies his interlocutor as Black, these judgments are not just happening in 
someone’s head. To see someone in these ways, and in even richer ways, requires bodily 
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movements, as well as orientation vis-à-vis other people and one’s environment.32 Moreover, acts 
of seeing, and thinking, are done by agents with particular kinds of bodies, who inhabit social 
positions that are more or less constrained, whose experiences, histories, and interests may 
radically differ. If cognition is embodied, it follows that stereotyping—qua cognitive activity—is 
also embodied.  
 Premise 2 draws out what it means for cognition to be embodied. The wording for the 
premise is borrowed from Robert Wilson and Lucia Foglia. Laying out the basics of embodied 
cognition for readers, they argue that the above thesis—which they dub “the embodiment 
thesis”—articulates “the working hypothesis of embodied cognitive science.”33 It is also the 
working hypothesis of phenomenologists who use embodiment as a lens to explore the lived 
realities of racism and sexism.34 The body plays two key roles in cognition, according to the 
embodiment thesis. First, the body plays a significant causal role in cognition: the body shapes 
the mind and, in turn, the mind shapes bodily orientations and behavior. Second, the body plays a 
constitutive role in thought: bodily dispositions and behavior function as elements of cognition. 
This second claim is particularly important when one contemplates the possibility that 
stereotyping constitutes discriminatory treatment.  
 Premise 3 applies the embodiment thesis to stereotyping: acts of stereotyping may be 
partially constituted by a person’s body and behavior, including discriminatory behavior. To 
illustrate the premise, consider a person who stereotypes my colleague of Asian heritage. What is 
happening when they perceive her voice as loud? The stranger’s eardrums vibrate. They notice 
her voice. If they notice her voice, that means they are paying some attention to her. Paying 
attention is a bodily enterprise, just as much as a mental one. Maybe the person looks up from 
what they are doing. Maybe instead the stranger tries to ignore my colleague because she is 
interrupting their concentration as they try to work. They keep their head down and try to focus, 
though they struggle. The idea is not just that a person’s thoughts accidentally “leak out” in body 
language or speech. Rather, the idea is that the act of hearing someone as loud is partially 
constituted by a range of physical reactions and dispositions, as well as micro- and macro-
behaviors.35   
 Consider a key thought behind premise three. According to the embodiment thesis, to 
stereotype someone is not just to judge that person “in your head” because of their presumed 
group membership. To stereotype is also to do something—and not just in a metaphorical sense. 
																																																								
32 For more on the notion of orientation, see Sarah Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, and 
Others (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006). 
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Situated, and Distributed Cognition (New Castle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008); Shaun Gallagher, How the 
Body Shapes the Mind (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006). 
34 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 11th ed., trans. Colin Smith (New York: Routledge, 
2001); Iris Marion Young, On Female Body Experience: “Throwing Like a Girl” and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005); Alcoff, Visible Identities. George Yancy, Black Bodies, White Gazes: The Continuing 
Significance of Race in America, 2nd edition  (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017; Helen Ngo, The Habits of 
Racism: A Phenomenology of Racism and Racialized Embodiment (New York, Lexington Books, 2018); Céline 
Leboeuf, “The Embodied Biased Mind,” in Erin Beeghly and Alex Madva, An Introduction to Implicit Bias: 
Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind (New York: Routledge: 2020). 
35 Noë, Action in Perception. Yancy, Black Bodies, 21. Yancy writes: “deep-seated racist emotive [and cognitive] 
responses may form part of the white bodily repertoire.” 
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Acts of stereotyping are “embodied actions.”36 If acts of stereotyping—qua embodied 
cognition—are actions plain and simple, they will sometimes constitute discriminatory treatment 
in a behavioral sense. Stereotyping will constitute discriminatory treatment if and only if the 
person who stereotypes behaves in a distinctive way towards someone because of that person’s 
presumed group membership.   
 This argument does not entail that stereotyping always constitutes discrimination. 
Consider my personal experience on the bus. I stare out the window and my mind wanders as I 
think about my fellow passengers. Though I stereotype, my behavior is the same as if I were 
thinking about something else entirely: what to have for lunch or how to spend my weekend. 
Because thoughts and behavior come apart in this way, the embodied mind argument could never 
show that stereotyping always constitutes discriminatory treatment in a behavioral sense. At 
most, the argument applies in a wide range of cases, where the contents of discriminatory 
thoughts express themselves in discriminatory behaviors, and vice versa. 
 Some readers will reject the claim that cognition and perception are embodied; hence 
they will be skeptical of this argument from Premise 1. I direct such readers to the empirical and 
philosophical literature on embodied cognition where Premise 1 is fully defended.37 Even though 
I cannot fully settle the matter here, one thing should be clear: embodied cognition deserves to be 
taken seriously. From the perspective of many theorists, it motivates a compelling argument for 
the constitutive claim.  
 
The regulative mind argument. A final argument for the constitutive claim goes like this: 
 
1) It is discriminatory to articulate or put into effect group-specific norms, rules, 
evaluative standards, etcetera. 
 
2) Stereotyping involves articulating or putting into effect group-specific norms, rules, 
or evaluative standards. 
______________ 
 
3) Stereotyping constitutes discriminatory treatment. 
 
 Premise 1 offers a partial gloss of the regulative view of discriminatory treatment. It says: 
it is discriminatory to articulate or put into effect group-specific rules, norms, or evaluative 
standards. Since the present argument hinges on how one understands the regulative view, its 
details must be examined. Start with this observation. Discriminatory rules very often have the 
following feature: people act on them, putting the rules into practice. Examples include 
Presidential Executive Order 9066 and Jim Crow laws mandating racial segregation. Yet 
consider the Briggs Initiative. In 1978, this ballot measure sought to ban gay people from 
working as public school employees in the state of California.38 Gay rights activists argued that 
the measure treated gays and lesbians people in a discriminatory way. It would have required 
school districts to fire employees who engaged in “public” homosexual conduct, and it 
prohibited their hire as well. Ultimately, the Briggs Initiative was voted down. Even so, it is 
perfectly appropriate to say that the ballot measure treated gays and lesbians in a discriminatory 
																																																								
36 Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, The Embodied Mind, 173. 
37 See footnotes 33 and 34 for references.  
38 For the Initiative’s details, see https://repository.uchastings.edu/ca_ballot_inits/324/ 
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way. It articulated disadvantageous rules that targeted them but not heterosexual people. What 
this reveals is that rules, norms, and evaluative standards can be discriminatory, whether or not 
they are put into practice or acted upon. 
 The Briggs Initiative suggests another lesson as well: there is no knowledge or awareness 
condition on discriminatory treatment in the regulative sense. Consider a gay high school teacher 
in 1978 Los Angeles. Maybe he isn’t aware of the Briggs Initiative. Even so, it treats him in a 
discriminatory way: the ballot measure says that his school district should fire him and implies 
that he is deviant. One might object that this example is too far fetched. No gay man in 1978 
would be so clueless. Even so, the hypothetical highlights an entirely general feature of 
discriminatory treatment. Discrimination can happen to you, even if you don’t realize it. 
Employers may have “hidden” discriminatory hiring policies, for example.39 Even when such 
information is concealed from job candidates, they can experience discrimination. Receptionists 
might smile and happily accept their resumes, knowing all the while that applicants’ information 
will be shredded as soon as they leave.  
 Though these remarks do not fully clarify the content of the regulative view of 
discriminatory treatment, they tell us quite a lot. Indeed they reveal why thoughts may be 
discriminatory. First, discriminatory treatment is possible even when group-specific rules, norms, 
and standards are not acted on. It is thus no objection to the constitutive claim that thoughts exist 
“in the head.” Even if this were true, cognitive acts have the potential to possess the exact 
property that makes regulative tools like social norms, speech acts, and laws discriminatory. Like 
norms, speech, and laws, thoughts can articulate or put into effect group-specific rules, norms, or 
evaluative standards.40 Second, persons need not be aware of or know how they are being treated 
in order to experience discriminatory treatment. You might suspect that someone has 
discriminated against (or in favor of) you in virtue of what they think about you, but you can’t 
know for sure because you are not a mind reader.41 You might never find out that someone thinks 
less of you because of your presumed group membership because they intentionally hide that 
information from you. Even so, there is a matter of fact—independent of your knowledge or 
awareness—regarding whether you have been treated in a discriminatory way.  
 Premise 2 says this: stereotyping involves articulating or putting into effect group-
specific norms, rules, or evaluative standards. Empirical research comes in handy when 
defending this premise, including research in psychology on “dual character concepts.”42 
																																																								
39 In some cases, employers may not even know that they have a discriminatory policy (e.g., a racially motivated 
double standard for hiring or firing), or have treated employees in a discriminatory way. For examples from case 
law, see Linda Hamilton Krieger, “The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination 
and Equality Opportunity,” Stanford Law Review 47, no. 6 (1995): 1161-1248.  
40 The term “putting into effect” has multiple meanings. “To put into effect” can be to put something into practice 
via action or speech. For more on how norms can be enacted in speech, see Mary Kate McGowan, Just Words: On 
Speech and Hidden Harm (Oxford: OUP, 2019); Sara Bernstein, “Biased Evaluative Descriptions,” Manuscript. My 
point here is that speech and action are not necessary for enacting norms. Norms and rules can be “put into effect” in 
thought alone. A person might apply a social rule or cultural norm to someone without saying so, for example. In 
doing so, they activate the norm and apply it to someone, hence “putting it into effect.”   
41 This kind of uncertainty is characteristic of discriminatory treatment in a wide range of cases, especially those 
involving “microaggressions.” For examples see Claudia Rankine, Citizen: An American Lyric (New York, NY: 
Graywolf Press, 2014); Regina Rini, The Ethics of Microaggression (New York, NY: Routledge, 2020), esp. 39-70. 
42 Joshua Knobe, Sandeep Prasada, and George Newman, “Dual Character Concepts and the Normative Dimension 
of Conceptual Representation,” Cognition 127, no. 2 (2017): 242-257; Guillermo Del Pinal and Kevin Reuter, “Dual 
Character Concepts in Social Cognition: Commitments and the Normative Dimension of Conceptual 
Representation,” Cognitive Science 41, no. 3 (2017): 477-501. 
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Examples of such concepts include “woman,” “Catholic,” “doctor,” “undocumented person,” and 
“disabled person.” What dual character concepts share in common is that they have a descriptive 
dimension, as well as a normative one. Hence they contain two kinds of meaning. Consider the 
concept “Catholic.” The concept includes a set of features that can be specified in purely 
descriptive terms. Catholics are Christians, for example, and they have a distinctive set of 
religious beliefs and practices. However, the concept of “Catholic” also specifies the abstract 
values associated with being a Catholic, as well as norms and rules that go along with being a 
“good” Catholic. Because of the concept’s dual character, anyone who falls under its heading is 
subject to group-specific evaluations. Researchers who study dual character concepts 
hypothesize that we have them for all socially salient social groups: age, gender, sexuality, race, 
ethnicity, religion, and even socio-economic status. Indeed any social group that performs 
characteristic tasks or has a dedicated social role ought to have a dual character concept 
associated with it, including concepts like “elementary school teacher,” “artist,” “knitter,” “anti-
vaxxer,” “detective,” “Tesla owner,” “Cross-Fit enthusiast,” and many others.43 If all such 
concepts have a dual character, all acts of stereotyping involve activating—hence “putting into 
effect”—group-specific norms, rules, or standards. 
 The conclusion stands independently any particular research paradigm. In The Sources of 
Normativity, Christine Korsgaard suggests why, when she introduces the notion of a practical 
identity.44 Korsgaard explains that a practical identity is “a description under which you value 
yourself.”45 On her view, each of us has a practical identity. I may see myself simultaneously as 
“a human being, a man or woman [or a person whose gender identity does not fit neatly within 
the binary], an adherent of a certain religion, a member of an ethnic group, a member of a certain 
profession, someone’s lover or friend.”46  “All of these identities,” Korsgaard notes, “give rise to 
reasons and obligations.”47 By seeing myself under a certain description, I am necessarily 
committed to seeing myself as answerable to norms, rules, and obligations associated with my 
identities. A parallel claim also holds. When I see other people—even strangers—under a certain 
description, I see them as answerable to norms, rules, and obligations that correspond to their 
identities too. Further, in socially placing someone, I am situating that person in a particular 
social location vis-à-vis myself, as well as others. Norms, rules, and evaluative standards govern 
the ways in which people in various social locations ought to interact and understand one 
another. 
 One can also pan out and look at the bigger social picture. Our views of groups don’t 
come from thin air. They fit into wider narratives about why people are the way they are and 
how they ought to be. Such narratives imply, if not entail, that certain types of people have a 
“natural” or “proper” place in the social order, and they delineate how people of certain types are 
supposed to act, feel, and think. To stereotype someone is thus not just to expect something of 
them, as if one were a scientist forming a reasoned prediction or hypothesis. It is to draw people 
into these wider narratives.48  
																																																								
43 For skepticism regarding this point, see Sarah Jane Leslie, “Hilary Clinton is the Only Man in the Obama 
Administration,” Analytic Philosophy 56, no. 2 (2015): 111-141.   
44 Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 101. 
45 Ibid.  
46 Ibid.		
47 Ibid.  
48 Hilde Lindemann, Holding and Letting Go: Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2014).  
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  These reflections underscore what philosopher Victoria McGeer has called “the 
regulative nature” of the human mind.49 On McGeer’s view, the function of cognition is not just 
drawing distinctions, making predictions, or forming hypotheses. Cognition—how we think and 
what we think—is inherently normative. Each of us is trained to see the world in particular ways 
that are laden with prescriptive and ideological significance. 50 Even when these thoughts are not 
articulated out loud, they have emotional impact, and they serve to shape the option-spaces of 
social interaction and opportunity, often in ways that entrench the status quo. To stereotype is 
therefore not just to expect things; it is to make judgments using concepts that place people into 
social frameworks with prescriptive and normative significance. 
 With these two premises, a powerful argument for the constitutive claim reveals itself. If 
it is discriminatory to articulate or put into effect group-specific rules, norms, evaluative 
standards, etcetera, and all acts of stereotyping do this, i.e., they articulate or put into effect 
group-specific rules, norms, evaluative standards, etcetera, stereotyping constitutes 
discriminatory treatment. Not just sometimes, but always.  
 
2.3 Bringing It All Together. If my analysis is correct, the full rationale for the constitutive claim 
is multifaceted. Stereotyping is not discriminatory for one reason, but for many. We can treat 
people in a discriminatory way in virtue of what we think of them, how we judge them (quickly 
or slowly), how we act or fail to act towards them, and the standards and rules to which we 
subject them. 
 Though it would be impossible to reduce this multidimensional picture to a single 
argument for the constitutive claim, it would also be a mistake to ignore the common thread 
between these diverse forms of treatment. Each aspect of discriminatory treatment pinpoints a 
distinctive way in which we relate to others. These forms of treatment are partially constitutive 
of our relationships with others, making these relationships what they are.51  
 Understanding discrimination as a relational phenomenon is illuminating. Commonly 
theorists attach a worse-than condition to discriminatory treatment. However, from a relational 
perspective, we see that giving people undue benefits because of group membership can be just 
as problematic as saddling them with unjust burdens.52 Both relations of advantage and 
disadvantage work together to sustain unjust, oppressive social relationships. The problem is not 
just anti-Black racism, for example; it is also white privilege. Discrimination is therefore better 
thought of as a form of unequal or differential treatment, which people on the winning and losing 
sides of inequalities can experience. If so, positively stereotyping someone—for example, by 
presuming that they are credible or trustworthy because of their group membership—can 
constitute discriminatory treatment too. It may even be discriminatory to pigeonhole people in 
																																																								
49 McGeer, “Mind-Making Practices.” For a related view, see Tadeusz Wiesław Zawidzki, Mindshaping: A New 
Framework for Understanding Human Social Cognition (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013). 
50 Sally Haslanger, “Cognition as a Social Skill,” Australasian Philosophical Review 3, no. 1 (2019): 5-25; Erin 
Beeghly, “What’s Wrong with Stereotypes? The Falsity Hypothesis,” Social Theory and Practice 47, no. 1 (2021):  
33-61. 
51 One finds a version of this view in Lindemann, 2014. Discussing Carl Elliot’s interpretation of Wittgenstein, 
Lindemann suggests that to treat someone as a person is a matter of “taking up a certain attitude or stance towards 
her” (12). Lindemann’s insight here suggests that treating someone as an equal—hence relating to them as an 
equal— has a necessary attitudinal component. See also Elizabeth Anderson, “What’s the Point of Equality?” Ethics 
109, no. 2 (1999), 287-337. 
52 Medina, Epistemology of Resistance; Emmalon Davis, “Typecasts, Tokens, and Spokespersons: A Case for 
Credibility Excess as Testimonial Injustice,” Hypatia 31, no. 3 (2016): 485-501. 
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ways that neither benefit nor burden them, but which could have hurt or helped them had the 
situation been different.  
 
3. STEREOTYPING AS WRONGFUL DISCRIMINATION 
A moralized version of the constitutive claim is easy to motivate, given the arguments in the last 
section. Its justification takes the form of a conditional. If an act of stereotyping 
 
(a) qualifies as discriminatory in a non-moralized sense and  
 
(b) is morally wrong, then 
 
 (c) stereotyping in that instance constitutes wrongful discrimination.  
 
Last section I showed that the conditional’s first part (a) can be satisfied. Stereotyping will count 
as discriminatory treatment in a non-moralized sense, either sometimes (in a behavioral sense) or 
always (in a distinction-drawing and regulative sense). The conditional’s second part (b) 
becomes now crucial. When, if ever, is it wrong to stereotype?  
 Start with a skeptical perspective. In “Is Racism in the Heart?” Tommie Shelby argues 
that racial prejudices are beliefs. He writes: 
 
Beliefs aren’t the kind of thing that can be immoral; they can be true or false, warranted 
or unwarranted, rational or irrational, but certainly not virtuous or evil, just or unjust, at 
least not in themselves.”53 
 
Shelby seems to be saying that ethical norms do not apply to beliefs and, by extension, to 
cognitive states such as expectations, beliefs, predictions, and suspicions. If so, stereotyping 
someone “in your head” could never be wrongful discrimination. Ethical norms don’t 
legitimately apply to cognitive states or processes. 
 The contention is hard to believe. For millennia, ethical theories have criticized thoughts 
and ways of thinking. For virtue ethicists like Aristotle, ethical life is about living well, i.e., 
flourishing. To flourish as human, one must cultivate certain virtues, including intellectual 
virtues. If you judge someone in a way that is close-minded, your belief and way of forming it 
could be ethically vicious.54 In Christian ethics, thoughts and desires can be sinful. “Thou shalt 
not covet” is listed as one of the Ten Commandments, for example.55 Coveting is first and 
foremost a sin that consists in desiring things that aren’t yours. However, it can also have 
cognitive elements. For example, you might covet something because you believe that you are 
entitled to it. Such a belief could be sinful and hence wrong, according to The Old Testament. 
Perhaps oddly, consequentialists can say similar things, a fact which Shelby implicitly 
acknowledges. Cognitive and perceptual acts—just like actions in the more traditional sense—
can have bad consequences, so they may be extrinsically wrong.56 Extrinsic wrongness is not a 
fake or second-tier kind of wrongness. If it’s extrinsically wrong to eat meat because of the 
																																																								
53 Tommie Shelby, “Is Racism in ‘The Heart?” Journal of Social Philosophy 33, no. 3 (2002): 411-420 at 416. 
54 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Christopher Rowe (Oxford: OUP, 2002), 176-189 (Book VI).  
55 Exodus 20:17.  
56 For analyses along these lines Lippert-Rasmussen, Born Free and Equal; Endre Begby, “Doxastic Morality: A 
Moderately Skeptical Perspective” Philosophical Topics 46, no. 1 (2018): 155-172.  
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harmful environmental consequences, eating meat is wrong and you shouldn’t do it. The same 
goes for thoughts and thinking, according to a consequentialist view. While Kantians have a 
different story to tell, the moral is similar. Suppose that ethics mandates respect for persons. If 
you judge someone based on demeaning, cruel, or patronizing stereotypes, you are disrespecting 
them.57 Even if your outward behavior were perfect, you would be failing to recognize the 
limitless value of a rational being and, hence, failing to treat someone as an end. Your thoughts 
would therefore be wrongful.58  
 The consensus across ethical theories is this: being a good person and treating others 
ethically are not just matters of how we behave. They are also about our emotional responses, the 
way in which we think about others, and much more.  
 Theorists of responsibility underscore this consensus. A control-based account of moral 
responsibility offers one perspective among many.59 According to control-based theories, we are 
responsible only for those things that we can control; hence only controllable aspects of what we 
do and think have the potential to be right or wrong. Theorists interested in this tradition note 
that human have the capacity to learn and grow. The very fact that teachers give students exams 
and bother teaching them in the first place shows that we have a great deal of indirect control 
over what we automatically know (and what we don’t), as well as how we think. 60 The issue is 
not just about individual control, either. How we think and what we think reflects ways in which 
we have been collectively trained to think about and perceive others.61 Yet other theorists of 
responsibility focus on the so-called “deep self.”62 According to deep self theories, even if 
thoughts or actions were uncontrollable and spontaneous, we would still be responsible for them 
if and when they reflect aspects of our selves that we have cultivated over time, which connect to 
our core values and our specific “take” on the world. Despite the diversity of views, theorists 
agree on one thing: the human mind—what we think and how we think—is shaped by and 
infused with agency. Where there is agency, there is a potential for responsibility and ethical 
evaluation. 
 The positive claim in the background here—which is largely independent of any 
particular philosophical theory—is that ethical norms apply to actions, as well as to elements of 
our inner lives, including cognitive states and processes. If so, stereotyping can sometimes be 
wrongful, even if it happens “in your head.” A moralized version of the constitutive claim is 
																																																								
57 For discussion of this point as it relates to judgments of credibility, see Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: The 
Power and Ethics of Knowing (Oxford: OUP, 2009), 44–45. Fricker argues that testimonial injustice insults people’s 
humanity qua knowers. See also Rima Basu, “The Wrongs of Racist Beliefs,” Philosophical Studies (2018), 1- 16 at 
13; Rima Basu, “What We Epistemically Owe Each Other,” Philosophical Studies (2019): 1-17. 
58 Kantian discussions of self-respect emphasize something similar, namely, that treating oneself “as an end” 
requires properly appreciating your own intrinsic value. See Cynthia Stark, “The Rationality of Valuing Oneself: 
Kant on Self-Respect,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 35, no. 1 (1997): 65-82 at 69-70. 
59 For an overview of competing approaches, see Noel Dominguez, “Moral Responsibility for Implicit Biases: 
Examining Our Options,” in An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind, eds. Erin 
Beeghly and Alex Madva (New York: Routledge, 2020), 153-173. 
60 Iris Murdoch, “The Idea of Perfection,” The Sovereignty of the Good (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1970); Jules Holroyd, “Responsibility for Implicit Bias,” Journal of Social Philosophy 43, no. 3 (2012): 274-306; 
Alex Madva, “Implicit Bias, Moods, and Moral Responsibility,” Pacific Philosophy Quarterly 99, no. 1 (2018): 53-
78.  
61 Nancy Arden McHugh and Lacey J.  Davidson, “Epistemic Responsibility and Implicit Bias,” An Introduction to 
Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind, eds. Erin Beeghly and Alex Madva (New York, NY: 
Routledge, 2020), 174-190. 
62 Pamela Hieronymi, “Responsibility for Believing,” Synthese 161, no. 3 (2008): 357-373; Michael Brownstein, 
The Implicit Mind: Cognitive Architecture, the Self, and Ethics (Oxford: OUP, 2018). 	
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thereby vindicated. When an act of stereotyping constitutes discrimination and is also wrongful, 
as sometimes will be the case, stereotyping constitutes wrongful discrimination. Stereotyping 
will therefore sometimes be a form of discriminatory injustice, as feminist theorists and theorists 
of race have long suggested. 
 
4. WHY THE CONSTITUTIVE CLAIM MATTERS 
In closing, I’d like to give readers a sense of why the constitutive claim matters and why it is 
worth arguing for. My view is this. Not only is constitutive claim philosophically sound, it is also 
incredibly illuminating. Consider three of its big payoffs.  
 
Payoff 1: The constitutive claim helps us to better understand the moral psychology of 
stereotyping. 
 
The constitutive claim conveys a powerful message. If someone stereotypes you, they may be 
wrongfully discriminating against you. The wrong in question is not just about how someone has 
acted. Discrimination can happen in thought and reasoning, too. Because the constitutive claim 
makes this answer possible, it opens up a novel way of thinking about what goes awry when 
people wrongfully stereotype. The constitutive claim thus has the potential to serve as a useful 
hermeneutical resource, giving marginalized individuals a powerful frame for interpreting their 
experiences of injustice. It also lets people who stereotype—i.e., all of us—see exactly what we 
are doing, even if we manage to keep stereotypical expectations to ourselves. To stereotype 
someone is not just to think about that person in a way that may or may not have downstream 
discriminatory impacts. By stereotyping, we are literally engaging in a form of discriminatory 
treatment, even if we are just thinking about someone “in our head.” 
 
Payoff 2: The constitutive claim reveals normative resources that can be used to solve ethical 
puzzles associated with stereotyping. 
 
The constitutive claim also unlocks philosophical resources that could help to answer this 
pressing question: when and why is stereotyping wrong? If stereotyping were a form of 
discrimination, the best theory of wrongful discrimination might be able to explain when and 
why is it wrong to stereotype too.   
 At least a dozen potential theories present themselves, including the following: 
 
Lippert-Rasmussen: discrimination is wrong if and only if it is sufficiently harmful.63  
 
Arneson: discrimination is wrong if and only if it is motivated by prejudice.64 
																																																								
63 Lippert-Rasmussen, Born Free and Equal, 165-170. I keep the terminology general to convey the big-picture idea 
of the theory; see the citation for the details. See also Richard Arneson, “Discrimination and Harm,” The Routledge 
Handbook of the Ethics of Discrimination, ed. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (New York, NY: Routledge, 2017), 151-
163.  
64 Richard Arneson, “What is Wrongful Discrimination?” San Diego Law Review 43, no. 4 (2006): 775-808. 
Arneson argues that “intrinsically wrongful discrimination occurs when an agent treats a person identified as being 
of a certain type differently than she otherwise would have done because of unwarranted animus or prejudice against 
persons of that type” (779). He claims that he is offering a deontological account of wrongful discrimination that 
articulates an “if and only if” claim as stated above. In other work, he endorses a harm-focused theory of wrongful 
discrimination. See Arneson, “Discrimination and Harm.” 
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Khaitan: discrimination is wrong if and only if it frustrates people’s ability to lead 
flourishing lives.65 
 
Moreau: discrimination is wrong if and only if it entrenches inequality.66 
 
Eidelson: discrimination is wrong if and only if it manifests deliberative disrespect or 
is harmful.67 
 
Hellman: discrimination is wrong if and only if it is demeaning or compounds social 
injustice.68  
 
 Consider this possibility. The best theory of wrongful discrimination might do double 
duty, explaining what’s wrong with discrimination in the traditional sense and stereotyping. Call 
this hypothesis normative symmetry. At least one theorist in the above list is officially committed 
to symmetry. On Lippert-Rasmussen’s view, nothing is ever intrinsically wrong. Whether 
discrimination manifests in thinking, action, or institutional policies, it is wrong—when it is— 
due to its downstream impacts, specifically, on people’s welfare. Other theorists don’t commit to 
symmetry, but their theories easily extend to the realm of thought and reasoning. Consider 
Khaitan’s theory. On his view, discrimination is wrong if and only if it frustrates human 
flourishing. This view has the potential to apply to both stereotyping and discrimination in the 
traditional sense. People who stereotype others, especially in denigrating ways, may undercut 
their own moral wellbeing and ability to reason well, hence their ability to flourish; at the same 
time, their acts of stereotyping may have consequences that prevent others from living well. 
Similar observations apply to Sophia Moreau’s equality-based theory. On her view, 
discrimination is wrong, when it is, because it reflects and entrenches problematic social 
inequalities. The claim applies equally well to discriminatory thoughts, actions, and policies. Her 
analysis is thus relevant to stereotyping.69 Symmetry raises an interesting possibility: perhaps it is 
wrong to stereotype if and when stereotyping constitutes wrongful discrimination. If, so, we 
could identify the conditions under which stereotyping is wrong by analyzing the conditions 
under which discrimination in general is wrong.  
 A second hypothesis is in the offing as well: normative asymmetry. One motivation for 
asymmetry begins with this observation. Not all species of discrimination necessarily possess the 
same normative profile. It has been suggested, for example, that direct and indirect 
																																																								
65 Tarunabh Khaitan, A Theory of Discrimination Law (Oxford: OUP, 2015). Khaitan is focused mostly on illegal 
discrimination, but his theory has the potential to work for morally wrongful discrimination as well. For a related, 
“freedom-focused” theory, see Adam Hosein, “Freedom, Sex Roles, and Antidiscrimination,” Law and Philosophy 
34, no. 5 (205): 485-517.  
66 Sophia Moreau, Faces of Inequality: A Theory of Wrongful Discrimination (Oxford: OUP, 2020).  
67 Eidelson, Discrimination and Disrespect, 223. 
68 Hellman, When is Discrimination Wrong?, 34-38. Deborah Hellman, “Indirect Discrimination and the Duty to 
Avoid Compounding Injustice,” Foundations of Indirect Discrimination Law, eds. Hugh Collins and Tarunabh 
Khaitain, (London: Bloomsbury, 2018), 105-122. In her book, Hellman argues that discrimination is wrong if and 
only if it is demeaning. In her later work on indirect discrimination, she modifies her theory to the disjunctive claim 
stated above.  
69 See Moreau, Faces of Inequality, 55 fn 19. 
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discrimination are wrong for different reasons.70 Consider Deborah Hellman’s view. She 
contends that direct discrimination is wrong if and only if it is demeaning.71 To demean is to send 
the message that a person or group is morally less than or not fully human. However, on her 
view, indirect discrimination is wrong—when it is—because it compounds social injustice.72 
Thus direct and indirect discrimination are wrong for different reasons. One might argue that 
discrimination in the traditional sense and stereotyping are similarly divergent when it comes to 
their wrong-making features.  
 Because it reveals these two hypotheses and invites us to test them, the constitutive claim 
is normatively illuminating. Theorists of stereotyping and discrimination find themselves in 
closer conversation.73 These conversations have the potential to yield a deeper, more complex 
understanding of when and why stereotyping is wrong, when and why discrimination is wrong, 
as well as how these wrongs relate to one another.  
 Some readers may object that this payoff is entirely speculative. No decisive evidence has 
been provided to show that the wrongs of discrimination really are the wrongs of stereotyping. 
So why take the constitutive claim seriously? In lieu of hasty dismissals, I advise an open mind. 
Normative symmetry cannot be ruled out in a few paragraphs, or even in a single essay. Testing 
the above hypotheses will require elbow grease. Indeed this essay is part of a larger project in 
which I explore what’s wrong with stereotyping and in which theories of wrongful 
discrimination play an essential role. My own view is that normative symmetry, with some 
qualifications, rules the day. I believe that one can hold this position while remaining attentive to 
the special normative features of thought, speech, actions, and policy and without papering over 
important ethical distinctions. I advance a radically pluralistic, context-sensitive account of 
wrongful stereotyping, nestled within a contractualist ethical theory, which has the potential to 
serve as a general theory of wrongful discrimination.74 
  
Payoff 3: The constitutive claim calls attention to the difficulty of living up to ethical norms in an 
unjust world. 
 
A final benefit of the constitutive claim is that it underscores the ethical challenges we face in 
living in an unjust world. Living ethically means cultivating a certain kind of ‘inner’ life and 
avoiding pernicious habits of thought, no matter how culturally pervasive.  
 The observation evokes what Iris Murdoch has called the idea of perfection. “As moral 
agents,” she argues, “we have to try to see justly, to overcome prejudice, to avoid temptation, to 
control and curb imagination, to direct reflection.”75 Writing about the philosophy of Martin 
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Luther King Jr., Paul C. Taylor refers to this kind of ideal as “tragic.”76 The tragedy lies in our 
persistent inability to live up to our own moral standards and to transform society into a more 
just, equitable place. “We struggle and fail,” writes Taylor, describing King’s message, “…and 
the failures are discouraging. But ‘that is the story of life.’”77 Taylor suggests that King’s 
perfectionism sounds “very much like what [Christopher] Lebron’s project of mobilizing civic 
shame means for democratic citizens…I’ve failed, by my own lights, we’re meant to say. I can 
and will do better.”78  
 One thinks of Fanon here too. “My true wish,” he writes in the introduction of Black 
Skin, White Masks, “is to get my brother, or white, to shake off the dust from that lamentable 
livery built up over centuries of incomprehension.”79 Which raises the question: how does one 
rid oneself of the baggage associated with oppression, when the world and other people will not 
let you forget, and in which you yourself cannot forget? It is clear that one must try. But it is 
equally clear that one will often fail. 
 The constitutive claim provides a special frame for understanding what we are struggling 
against and why we often fail. As feminists and theorists of race have long noted, the most 
intimate aspects of our selves, including our ways of thinking, agency, and modes of 
embodiment, are among the mechanisms of group oppression.80 Our fight against injustice is 
therefore not only against evil political forces, unjust laws, or oppressive social norms. We must 
also battle the intransigence of discriminatory hearts and minds, including—at least sometimes— 
our own, as we push towards justice. The constitutive claim throws this quandary into high relief, 
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